Abstract-Today, rapid growth in the amount of malicious software is causing a serious global security threat. Unfortunately, widespread signature-based malware detection mechanisms are not able to deal with constantly appearing new types of malware and variants of existing ones, until an instance of this malware has damaged several computers or networks. In this research, we apply an anomaly detection approach which can cope with the problem of new malware detection. First, executable files are analyzed in order to extract operation code sequences and then n-gram models are employed to discover essential features from these sequences. A clustering algorithm based on the iterative usage of support vector machines and support vector data descriptions is applied to analyze feature vectors obtained and to build a benign software behavior model. Finally, this model is used to detect malicious executables within new files. The scheme proposed allows one to detect malware unseen previously. The simulation results presented show that the method results in a higher accuracy rate than that of the existing analogues.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rising popularity of the Internet and the increasing number of security-unaware users in the past few years are some of the most popular reasons behind the rapid development of malicious computer software [1] . Software, such as trojan horses, spyware or Internet worms, are designed to harm computers or networks, and nowadays the attackers produce them not only for fame or glory but also to profit at the expense of ordinary users [2] . That is why the problem of malware detection has become a critical topic in computer security.
Despite of the rapid development of new tools and strategies to detect malicious software, the signature-based detection approach remains the most popular commercial anti-malware solution. This approach involves a search of a sequence of bytes or instructions that is always present within a malicious executable and within the files already infected by that malware. The approach has proved effective only when the threats are known beforehand: specialists can determine a signature for a new malware executable only after an instance of this malware has damaged several computers or networks. Consequently, the signature-based approach is not able to cope with zero-day attacks, i.e. malicious software unseen previously.
One way to handle unknown malware includes the analysis of benign software executables to obtain a normal behavior profile and classification as suspicious of all files that deviate significantly from this profile. Since such approach is based only on legitimate software files, it can deal with the problem of zero-day malware that the classic signature method cannot handle. However, as a rule malware detectors based on the anomaly detection approach generate greater amounts of false alarms than signature-based antiviruses because not each suspicious executable file is malware.
A great amount of research applying the anomaly detection approach for finding malware files is conducted nowadays. In such studies, usually byte sequences of executable binaries are analyzed to find deviations from benign software behavior. Study [3] proposes a method to analyze the binary content of files using n-gram analysis and efficient statistical modeling techniques in order to determine the validity of file type in network traffic flows or on a local disk. In paper [4] , byte sequence frequencies are investigated to profile benign software binaries and identify malicious executables as outliers or anomalies. The investigation uses the principal component analysis and a one-class support vector machine, without predefining the malicious patterns to be classified. A detection model based on byte frequency to deal with the problem of malware variants detection is proposed in [5] . The authors claim that if a suspicious malware is similar to any known malware in terms of byte frequency the suspicious malware is determined to be a variant of the latter.
Recent studies have investigated the ability of operational codes (opcodes) to detect malicious software [6] . An opcode is the portion of a machine language instruction that specifies the operation to be performed. Opcodes reveal significant statistical differences between malware and legitimate software and even single opcodes are able to serve as the basis for the detection of malicious executables [6] . In [7] , detection of unknown malicious code is based on previously seen examples and carried out with the help of opcode n-gram representation and several well-known classifiers. A new method for unknown malware detection using a data-mining-based approach is proposed in [8] . The method is based on the frequency of appearance of opcode-sequences and on such data-mining algorithms as decision trees, support vector machines, knearest neighbors and Bayesian networks.
In this research, we approach the problem of malware detection by analyzing operation code sequences obtained from executable files. We use n-gram models to extract essential features from these sequences and combine a matrix of the feature vectors discovered. We assume that some vectors in the feature matrix correspond to known malicious executables or files already infected by malware. However, our aim is to detect those malware types that are not presented in the training set. The 11th Annual IEEE CCNC -Security, Privacy and Content Protection a benign software behavior model. This model is used to detect malicious executables within new files. Such approach allows one to construct a normal software model and subsequently detect zero-day malware which deviate from this model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The extraction of feature vectors based on applying n-gram models to operation code sequences is considered in Section II. Section III introduces a scheme for building a benign software model and classifying new files. In Section IV, we present several simulation results to evaluate the algorithm proposed and compare it with analogues. Finally, Section V draws the conclusions and outlines future work.
II. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND SELECTION

A. Representing executables through opcodes
An opcode is the portion of a machine language instruction that specifies the operation to be performed: arithmetic or data manipulation, logical operation or program control. Such instruction can contain the specification of one or more operands which show upon what data the operation should act. The operands depend on CPU architecture and may consist of registers, values in memory, values stored on the stack, I/O ports, etc. There are families of malware such that two members of the same family share a common "engine" [7] . In order to hide such engines, malware designers can locate them in different locations inside executables so that these engines become mapped to different addresses in memory. To cope with this problem, it is suggested that only the sequence of opcodes in the executable have to be analyzed, without taking into account opcode parameters [7] . Thus, for each executable file, a sequence of opcodes can be extracted and then used to classify this file either as a benign software or malware.
B. N-gram models
To extract features from each such sequence, n-gram model is applied. N-gram models are widely used in statistical natural language processing [9] and speech recognition [10] . An ngram is a sub-sequence of n overlapping items (characters, letters, words, etc) from a given sequence. For example, the result of the application of 2-gram character model to the string "malware" is "ma", "al", "lw", "wa", "ar", "re".
We consider a set of executable files optionally containing malware files. Let us denote this set as the training set. An ngram word model is applied to transform all opcode sequences extracted from the files of this set to sequences of n-opcodes. Such sequences are then used to construct an n-gram frequency vector, which expresses the frequency of every n-opcode in the analyzed sequence. To obtain this vector, we find all unique n-opcodes contained in the executables of the training set, and the frequency vector is built by counting the number of occurrences of each such n-opcode entry in the analyzed sequence. For example, the application of the 2-gram model for the opcode sequence "DEC POP NOP ADD ADD ADD" returns a frequency vector which has one in the positions corresponding to grams "DEC POP", "POP NOP" and "NOP ADD" and two in the position corresponding to "ADD ADD". Thus, each opcode sequence is transformed to a numeric vector of length N equal to the number of unique opcode n-grams found in the training set. The matrix consisting of these vectors is called the feature matrix, and it can be analyzed to find anomalies and to build a benign software model.
C. Feature selection
The application of n-gram models returns high-dimensional feature vectors even for small values of n. In order to reduce time and computing resources when classifying those vectors, a dimensionality reduction technique is supposed to be employed. In this study, we use a well-known supervised dimensionality reduction method called RELIEF [11] . The key idea of this method is to estimate attributes according to how well their values distinguish among instances that are near each other. For this purpose, for each feature i a weight w i equal to zero is assigned, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n f } and n f is the total number of features after applying an ngram model. Then, for a feature vector x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n f } selected randomly, the algorithm searches for its two nearest neighbors: one from the same class (called the nearest hit) and the other from a different class (called the nearest miss). Once the nearest hit
} have been found, we update the weight value for each feature as follows:
After that, a new feature vector is selected randomly and the process of updating the weights continues. Finally, n sf features with the highest weights are selected. Such feature selection method is well suited for Support Vector Machines [12] , [13] , because in the space of selected features a hyperplane separating individuals which belong to different categories can be found easier and more accurately. The algorithm could also employ the kernel trick and, therefore, select features in the kernel space [14] .
III. ALGORITHM
The algorithm proposed can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the feature matrix obtained from the training set is analyzed, and a benign software model is discovered with the help of our method Iterative Support Vector Machine Clustering (ISVMC) and Support Vector Data Descriptions (SVDDs). In the second stage, this model is employed to detect malware executables within recently arrived computer files. In addition to this, to be able to analyze new opcode sequences, the system is supposed to be retrained after working for some period of time.
A. Building a Benign Software Model
The method we employ to describe the benign software model is based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [18] , [19] . SVMs are supervised learning models with associated learning algorithms that analyze data and recognize patterns. Over the last decade, SVMs have been applied for many classification problems because of their flexibility and computational efficiency. As a rule, during the training, an SVM takes a set of input points, each of which is marked as belonging to one of two categories, and builds a model representing the input points in such way that the points of different categories are divided by a clear gap that is as wide as possible. Thereafter, a new data point is mapped into the same space and predicted
The 11th Annual IEEE CCNC -Security, Privacy and Content Protection to belong to a category based on which side of the gap it falls on. SVM models can efficiently perform linear and non-linear classification by mapping input vectors into high-dimensional feature spaces. A linear SVM model separates data belonging to different categories by using a hyperplane so that the distance from it to the nearest data point on each side is maximized. In case such a hyperplane does not exist, the algorithm chooses a hyperplane that splits the input points as cleanly as possible. For mislabeled points, a penalty function which measures the degree of misclassification of the data points is introduced. Thus, the model is built to maximize the distance from the separating hyperplane to the nearest data point on each side, taking into account the penalties caused by mislabeled data points. The kernel trick allows the SVM algorithm to become nonlinear to separate points by a hyperplane in a transformed feature space.
A regular SVM model classifies data belonging to two different categories. Let us consider a classification problem where q samples belong to two categories: if sample x i belongs to the first category, then its label y(x i ) = 1, and otherwise y(x i ) = −1. In this case, the hyperplane (w, b) for the SVM model can be found after solving the following optimization problem:
where i is the slack variable, which measures the degree of misclassification of x i , C is the penalty parameter and function φ(x) maps x to a higher dimensional space. Once optimal hyperplane (w, b) is found, a new sample x is classified as follows:
where function s(x) is calculated as
In this research, SVMs are applied iteratively to divide all feature vectors corresponding to non-infected files into several clusters. For this reason, a benign software feature vector x r1 is picked randomly and labeled as l b 1 , whereas all vectors related to malware are labeled as l m . A two-class SVM is trained using these vectors. For this SVM, y(x r1 ) = 1 and the category of all malware vector is considered as −1. The optimal hyperplane (ω 1 , b 1 ) is found and the function s 1 (x) is defined as shown in (4) . Here the upper index means that the hyperplane is built based on just one benign feature vector. Further, another benign vector x r2 is selected randomly from the remaining ones and the value of function
for benign software files is introduced and the vector x r2 is marked with this label. After that, new SVM is trained based on x r1 and x r2 and all malware vectors. Once the optimal hyperplane has been found, the next benign feature vector not taken yet is chosen and classified.
Let us assume that, in some point, k feature vectors corresponding to non-infected files have been already marked with labels l 
Let us notice, that S ij (x r k+1 ) = −S ji (x r k+1 ). The vector x r k+1 falls into the category i * which can be found as follows:
If this category corresponds to one of the benign software classes {l
is labeled with a corresponding mark. Otherwise, the number of labels for non-infected files is incremented by one and the vector x r k+1 is labeled as l b t+1 . Let us notice that such choice of the label can be related to the MaxMin strategy used in the decision and game theory for maximizing the minimum gain [15] . This approach is also used in fuzzy multi-class SVMs [16] .
Assume that now all benign software vectors are flagged with the help of different labels, i.e. these vectors belong to different clusters. After that, the cluster correction procedure begins. Each iteration of this correction starts by randomly picking one vector corresponding to a non-infected file. All the remaining vectors, including the vectors corresponding to malware, are used to train SVMs. The vector picked is then classified as described in the previous paragraph. If this vector is labeled as benign software, it is placed to the corresponding cluster. Otherwise, a new cluster is created, and we put the vector into it. Notice that if the considered vector is classified as malware but belongs to a cluster containing only one instance, then no new cluster is created and the label of the vector is not changed. Once the first vector has been analyzed, the next one is selected randomly, and the procedure continues. The iteration finishes after each feature vector corresponding to benign software has been checked. If, during the algorithm iteration, at least one vector has been redesignated, new iteration is started. The algorithm stops when, at some step, none of the clusters has been changed during the whole iteration. The issue of convergence of this algorithm remains open. However, let us notice that in all simulations we conducted the algorithm converged after several iterations, as shown in the next section.
After the procedure of label correction has been finished, the approach based on Support Vector Data Descriptions (SVDDs) is applied to complete the construction of the benign software model. An SVDD finds a closed boundary around the data belonging to one category by constructing an hypersphere which contains all data of this category [20] . The sphere is characterized by center c and radius R > 0. Let us assume, that there are q data vectors x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q which belong to one class, i.e. y(x i ) = 1, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. The center c of SVDD hypershepre (c, R) for this data set can be defined as Here α = (α 1 , . . . , α q ) is the solution of the following optimization problem:
where function φ(x) maps x to a higher dimensional space and C is the penalty parameter which controls the trade-off between the hypershpere volume and classification errors. The radius R of the sphere (c, R) is calculated as follows:
where x k is any vector from the dataset such as α k < C.
Once optimal hypersphere (c, R) is found, a new sample x is classified as follows:
where function d(x) is calculated as
Here y(x) = −1 means that x is classified as an outlier.
Let us assume that after ISVMC have been applied, the number of benign clusters is equal to n For the index i which does not satisfy these conditions, the ith SVM model is used to classify new files. As a rule, SVDD models are chosen as classifiers for those categories of benign software which contain few vectors. Let us denote the set of indexes for which SVM models are selected as Ω SV M and the set of indexes for which SVDD models are selected as Ω SV DD . Thus, the model for malware detection consists of |Ω SV M | hyperplanes and |Ω SV DD | hyperspheres.
B. Detection of Malware
To classify new file, we extract the opcode sequence from it, apply n-gram model and select features with the help of RELIEF. For the resulting feature vector x, values of functions s i and d i defined in the benign software model are calculated. The vector π(x) = (π i (x)) is then built, where
Then the vector x can be classified as follows:
• If ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n b l } : π i (x) ≥ 0, then the executable file corresponding to the vector x is classified as a benign software.
• If π i (x) < 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n b l }, then the executable file corresponding to the vector x is classified as a malware.
C. Updating the Model
As one can notice, the process of detection of malicious executable files within newly-arriving entries is based only on opcode n-grams extracted from files contained in the training set. In particular, it means that if a newly-arriving malicious file differs from the benign software model only by opcode n-grams not presented in the files of the training set, it can be classified as normal. In order to reduce the likelihood of such an event, the system has to be retrained after processing some amount of new files or working during some period of time. During the retraining the benign software model is modified so that new unique opcode n-grams, which have been discovered when classifying executable files, are taken into consideration. For this reason, we propose to form a new training set consisting of a part of the old training set and newly-arriving files on the principle of first-in-first-out. Based on this set, a new feature matrix is formed. This matrix is used to build benign software model, which is then used to detect newly-arriving executable files.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We tested the algorithm proposed, using opcode sequences extracted from real executable files, some of which were infected with malware. Each malware belonged to one of ten different categories. The set of files was divided into a training set (600 files, including 22 infected ones) and a testing set (400 files, including 25 infected ones). This division was made in such a way that all the infected files in the testing set would belong to five malware types not presented in the training set. Thus, all the malicious files in the testing set can be referred to as zero-day attacks in relation to the training set. The extraction of features from opcode sequences was carried out The benign software model is built by applying the proposed iterative SVM clustering algorithm to the training set. First, all vectors corresponding to non-infected files were labeled as described in the previous section. Then some clusters were changed at the label correction stage. The number of cluster changes at each iteration is shown in Figure 1 . As one can see, the algorithm takes only few iterations to converge. The resulting number of clusters also varies for different ngram models and dimensionality reduction techniques. For example, in the case, when 2-gram model and RELIEF are used, this number is 7, while for 1-gram model it is equal to 29. Once the benign software model has been built, new files can be classified by using the approach described in the previous section. To evaluate the performance of the proposed detection technique, the following characteristics were calculated in our test:
• True positive rate: the ratio of the number of correctly detected malware to the total number of malware in the testing set;
• False positive rate: the ratio of the number of normal files classified as malware to the total number of normal files in the testing set;
• Detection accuracy: the ratio of the total number of normal files detected as normal and malware detected as malware to the total number of files in the testing set; Figure 2 shows the dependence between false positive and true positive rates for different n-gram models and dimensionality reduction techniques. For low values of false positive rate, the proposed method shows the best results in terms of true positive rate when RELIEF is applied to reduce dimensionality. When the method parameters are chosen optimally, more than seventy percent of zero-day malware are detected and the number of false alarms is almost zero. However, for such techniques as SNE and SPE, our iterative SVM clustering combined with SVDD fails to classify new files properly. We compared the performance of the proposed algorithm with well-known supervised classifiers and outlier detection techniques: Mahalanobis Distances (MD), K-means, Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN), Local Outlier Factor (LOF), multi-class fuzzy Support Vector Machine (SVM) and One-Class Support Vector Machine (OCSVM). While applying these algorithms, we either used the whole training set with labels or only files related to benign software, depending on the method. In order to extract features, 1-gram and 2-gram models were applied to opcode sequences. In the case of the 2-gram model, dimensionality reduction techniques such as PCA, SNE, SPE, LDA and RELIEF (RLF) were used. The comparison results are listed in Table I , where malware detection and classification accuracies are shown. All the optimal classifiers' parameters were found with the help of k-fold validation during the training stage, and the accuracy was calculated when applying those classifiers to the testing set. As one can see, the detection accuracy varies for different algorithms and different dimensionality reduction methods, but on average it does not exceed 93%. Such poor results can be explained by the fact that all malware types contained in the testing set were not presented in the training set. However, the clustering method based on the iterative usage of SVMs combined with SVDD (ISVMC+SVDD) and RELIEF to select the most essential features shows better results and outperforms all other techniques in terms of the zero-day malware detection accuracy.
With the help of the Table I , for each method compared, we selected the dimensionality reduction technique which returns the highest detection accuracy rate for the 2-gram model. For each such pair, the classifier and the method for reducing
The 11th Annual IEEE CCNC -Security, Privacy and Content Protection dimensions, the dependence between false positive and true positive rates is calculated and plotted in Figure 3 . The simulation results show that even for low values of n used in the n-gram model most of zero-day malware can be detected with the help of the proposed method. This fact makes our approach usable with limited computing resources. However, due to the structure of the learning algorithm, the training stage can take a long time if the training set contains larger number of files.
V. CONCLUSION
In this research, we employ a malware detection approach to detect zero-day malware. Executable files are analyzed in order to extract operation code sequences and n-gram models are employed to discover essential features from these sequences. The iterative SVM clustering and SVDDs are applied to analyze feature vectors obtained and to build a benign software behavior model. This model is then used to detect new malicious executable files. Thus, the algorithm proposed allows one to detect malware unseen previously. The simulation results show that the method reaches an accuracy rate that is higher than that of existing techniques.
In the next stage of our research, we are planning to develop the scheme to increase its classification accuracy. For this purpose, instead of applying n-gram models and RELIEF, we are going to design a more advanced technique to extract and select features from opcode sequences. As mentioned above, another important issue is to decrease time required for the training. Finally, operands of opcodes can give additional information about executable files, and therefore they should also be taken into consideration in the future.
